Last week, a Judge dismissed a defamation law suit brought by Tim Paterson, who sold a computer operating system to Microsoft in 1980, against journalist and author Sir Harold Evans and his publisher Little Brown. The software became the basis of Microsoft’s MS-DOS monopoly, and the basis of its dominance of the PC industry.

But history has overlooked the contribution of Kildall, who Evans justifiably described as “the true founder of the personal computer revolution and the father of PC software” in a book published three years ago.

In a chapter devoted to Kildall in Evans’ They Made America: From the Steam Engine to the Search Engine: Two Centuries of Innovators, Evans related how Paterson “[took] ‘a ride on’ Kildall’s operating system, appropriated the ‘look and feel’ of [Kildall's] CP/M operating system, and copied much of his operating system interface from CP/M.”

The story of how Bill Gates came to acquire an operating system is well known. In 1980, Kildall’s Digital Research provided the operating system for a wide range of microcomputers, and was established as the industry standard. IBM had approached Microsoft, then a tiny software company in the Seattle area, to provide a BASIC run-time for its first micro, the IBM PC. Gates offered to provide IBM an operating system too, even though he didn’t have one at the time. This required a hasty purchase.

Microsoft turned to Tim Paterson, whose garage operation Seattle Computer Products was selling a CP/M clone called 86-DOS. This had been developed under the code name QDOS (for “quick and dirty operating system”), and SCP sold it alongside an add-in CPU card. Microsoft turned this into the hugely successful DOS franchise.

(The oft-told story of Kildall spurning IBM to fly his plane is deeply misleading. It was IBM’s distribution and pricing of CP/M, which in the end was one of three operating systems offered with the first IBM PC, that ensured MS-DOS captured the market.)

Paterson brought the case against Evans in March 2005, as we reported here, claiming that Evans’ defamatory chapter caused him “great pain and mental anguish”.

Evans was puzzled that the chapter drew a defamation suit as it merely “recapitulate[d] and state[d] what 11, 12, 15 other books [said] and there [was] no public outcry, no public corrections, no website corrections, no criticism in reviews [that any of the accounts were erroneous”.

Taking a dim view of lawsuits designed to curb the First Amendment rights of journalists, Judge Thomas Zilly found that Paterson’s lawsuit failed on several important counts. In US law, Zilly pointed out, “truth is an absolute defense to a claim of defamation”.

Judge Zilly said Paterson falsely claimed Evans credited Kildall as the “inventor” of DOS, weakening his case. At the same time, the Judge found, Evans had faithfully recorded Paterson’s denial of Kildall’s view that QDOS “ripped off” CP/M.

The Judge also agreed that Paterson copied CP/M’s API, including the first 36 functions and the parameter passing mechanism, although Paterson renamed several of these. Kildall’s “Read Sequential” function became “Sequential Read”, for example, while “Read Random” became “Random Read”.

(DR came to regret not suing Microsoft “very early on”. For his part, Paterson was to plead that his operating system of choice, Kildall’s CP/M-86, was at the time unavailable for products based on Intel’s 8086 that he wanted to sell, necessitating the hasty clone).

Finally, Judge Zilly concluded that Evans acted without malice, and castigated the plaintiffs for introducing irrelevancies into court, including the claim that Kildall was an alcoholic.

“Plaintiffs fail to provide any evidence regarding ‘serious doubts’ about the accuracy of the Kildall chapter. Instead, a careful review of the Lefer notes… provides a research picture tellingly close to the substance of the final chapter.”

And with that, the case was dismissed.

The PC world might have looked very different today had Kildall’s Digital Research prevailed as the operating system of choice for personal computers. DRI offered manufacturers the same low-cost licensing model which Bill Gates is today credited with inventing by sloppy journalists – only with far superior technology. DRI’s roadmap showed a smooth migration to reliable multi-tasking, and in GEM, a portable graphical environment which would undoubtedly have brought the GUI to the low-cost PC desktop years before Microsoft’s Windows finally emerged as a standard.

But then Kildall was motivated by technical excellence, not by the need to dominate his fellow man.

Included are full transcripts of interviews with David Potter, Martin Riddiford, Mark Gretton, David Tupman and Nick Healey. (Charles Davies was interviewed too late for inclusion).

Start here.

Savour this irony.

Last week, we learned that incompatibilities Microsoft hadn’t written into its operating system posed a grave threat to users. Last week, we also learned that genuine incompatibilities Microsoft had deliberately written into its operating system posed no threat at all.

In the first instance Microsoft had primed a public relations campaign to warn of the dire consequences posed by these bogus incompatibilities. In the second instance, and times must be tough up there, Microsoft avoided using its public relations professionals to tell us that the genuine incompatibilities were harmless.

Are you still with us? If you’re feeling bewildered, your confusion is understandable.

The first instance refers to incompatibilities between Microsoft’s Windows 386, 3.x and Windows 95 products and DR-DOS. This was an operating system developed by Digital Research, and later acquired by Novell, which was 100 per cent compatible with Microsoft’s MS-DOS. Thanks to citizens in Iowa, who are pursuing a consumer class action lawsuit against Microsoft, these ancient malpractices are being aired once again, and Microsoft executives have been on the stand in Des Moines defending the company’s conduct.

Microsoft wanted users to believe that interoperability between DR-DOS and Windows was problematic.

The second instance refers to incompatibilities between Windows Vista and next-generation High Definition DVDs, BluRay and HD-DVD. The incompatibilities are deliberate, and part of the specification Microsoft gave hardware manufacturers so they could design Vista-compatible hardware. Just before Christmas, Peter Gutmann published a technical analysis of the Vista incompatibilities, listed some of the potential security and stability threats they posed, and some of the situations where they might cause real harm.

In this instance, while Microsoft has gone to great lengths to booby-trap its software to disable functionality when certain media discs are being played, and to degrade performance when it finds what it thinks is counterfeit media, or “unauthorized” copying — it wants us to believe this will not have serious consequences for users.

(Until Vista is tested in real world conditions, we won’t know for sure if Gutmann’s claims are alarmist and Microsoft is telling the truth, or not — or somewhere in between.)

We’ll deal with the most topical first.

Gutmann analysed the hardware specifications and declared several problem areas. When “premium content” was being played some functionality was deliberately disabled, specifically video I/O. Vista uses “tilt bits” to detect fluctuations in voltage and severely degrade the operation of the computer. He also said the specification posed problems for programmers developing free software device drivers, and would make the Vista-compatible hardware more expensive than it should be. Finally, Gutmann described catastrophic consequences for users who discovered their driver had been “revoked”.

Rather than address questions from Gutmann himself, or from the technical press and analysts, Dave Marsh, Microsoft’s lead program manager for video chose his own questions to answer, and passed them along to a colleague, who posted them on his blog.

Naturally these include several answers to questions Gutmann didn’t ask, but avoiding the press by selecting awestruck bloggers instead is Microsoft’s preferred way of dodging hard questions these days: at CES this month, Gates would only be interviewed by bloggers.

“Gates seems really relaxed unlike in many other interviews I have seen,” noted a blogger after watching one of these grillings, conducted by … a former Microsoft marketing guy.

Gutmann hadn’t asked whether Vista’s “content protection requirements apply equally to the Consumer Electronics industry supplied player devices such as an HD-DVD or Blu-Ray player”, but Marsh answers anyway. From then on, it’s a mixed bag.

Marsh agrees that Vista’s DRM taxes the CPU. He dodges the issue of Vista’s specs making hardware more expensive by saying that integrating DRM onto the chip in volumes will eventually bring the price down. (That’s a “yes”, then).

He agrees that S/PDIF, component video and audio are degraded, but says they are already in Windows XP and invoked when requested – and he passes the blame onto Hollywood. He refutes Gutmann’s claim that playing back protected content degrades the rest of Vista video output. (Gutmann cited the hypothetical case where medical images would be displayed in lower than optimal resolution when a protected High Definition DVD was being played at the same time – although if your radiographer is watching Porkys III Hi-Def Edition while looking at your scans, we suggest you find a new radiographer).

Marsh confirms that “tilt bits” will cause problems, but he ducks the question of what circumstances will cause tilt bits to be set, and throws the responsibility back on to the hardware vendors. He writes:

“It is pure speculation to say that things like voltage fluctuations might cause a driver to think it is under attack from a hacker. It is up to a graphics IHV to determine what they regard as an attack. Even if such an event did cause playback to stop, the user could just press ‘play’ again and carry on watching the movie (after the driver has re-initialized, which takes about a second).”

And… then what? Wait for another tilt bit reset, we guess, from speculative causes.

That sure sounds like a fun evening in!

And we throw Marsh’s reply to the F/OSS drivers issue open to you. Marsh asks,

“Do things such as HFS (Hardware Functionality Scan) affect the ability of the open-source community to write a driver?” And Marsh answers… “No. HFS uses additional chip characteristics other than those needed to write a driver. HFS requirements should not prevent the disclosure of all the information needed to write drivers.” Gutmann, who isn’t named in Marsh’s ventriloquist routine, isn’t impressed.

“Saying ‘we were only following orders’ has historically proven not to be a very good excuse,” he told the BBC News Online website. “If you have got the protection measures there, the impulse is to use the most stringent ones at your disposal.”

We’ll deal with events taking place in freezing Iowa in a more detail in a follow-up tomorrow, but the basic facts are as follows. The case has been a replay of Caldera vs Microsoft, with evidence brought in from other investigations. Caldera had inherited DR-DOS from Novell. Suit was filed in July 1996, and discovery continued throughout 1998 and 1999, with a serious of unfavourable judgements against Microsoft, one of which expanded the scope of the lawsuit. Microsoft settled just a week before it was due to go to court in January, paying Caldera $275m in damages. The Register covered the trial in detail at the time (list of links here, juiciest quotes (http://www.theregister.co.uk/1998/10/20/microsoft_on_trial/) here (http://www.theregister.co.uk/1999/05/24/unsealed_caldera_documents_expose_ms/).)

As with Internet Explorer, and Windows XP, Microsoft had failed to add new features to MS-DOS for several years. Microsoft adopted several tactics to destroy DR-DOS, the most damaging of which was tying PC makers into secret per-processor license agreements, which meant that they paid for Microsoft’s MS-DOS whether they shipped it with the PC or not, foreclosing the most important route to market.

But as DR-DOS matured, and Novell developed an alternative retail channel for the product, Microsoft adopted a campaign of disinformation. With the growing popularity of Microsoft’s Windows 3, which ran on top of either DOS, Microsoft wanted users to think that performance would degrade if using Windows with Novell’s rival product.

The formidable talents of Waggener Edstrom were enlisted. Microsoft’s DOS product manager Richard Freedman took the campaign to the press, vowing to “FUD DR DOS with every editorial contact made,” and to “develop key DR DOS FUD points for all press tours”.

“We’ll basically be covering all the key editors … We recommend that we ‘informally’ plant the bug of FUD in their ears. ‘Have you heard about problems with DR DOS?’ ‘That security feature is a neat idea and, gosh, such a feature would be great, but it’s just too easily circumvented.’ ‘Gee, it’s unfortunate that DR DOS can’t be loaded high all the time. MS-DOS 5.0 can.’ We’ll do this very tactfully. ‘If Digital Research came to Microsoft for help making DR DOS work with Windows, would Microsoft help them? Maybe not?’”

On Friday the Des Moines court heard this piece of testimony. It’s a video from an FTC hearing from 1993, and in the dock was Phil Barrett from Microsoft. It makes for an interesting comparison with the offering from Dave Marsh, above.

Question: Mr. Barrett, you were just asked if you had any knowledge of any Microsoft effort to produce any incompatibility between OS/2 or DR-DOS and Microsoft Windows. How do you define incompatibility within that context? What was your understanding of what you meant by that?

Answer: To prevent the products from working together.

Question: Would you consider an incompatibility something that popped up in, say, a nonfatal error message when there was no error that was being detected by that software?

Answer: No, I would not call that incompatibility.

Question: How would you make the distinction between the two?

Answer: Well, there was nothing done explicitly to prevent Windows from running on that operating system.

Question: Mr. Barrett, you were just asked if you had any knowledge of any Microsoft effort to produce any incompatibility between OS/2 or DR-DOS and Microsoft Windows. How do you define incompatibility within that context? What was your understanding of what you meant by that?

Answer: To prevent the products from working together.

Question: Would you consider an incompatibility something that popped up in, say, a nonfatal error message when there was no error that was being detected by that software?

Answer: No, I would not call that incompatibility.

Question: How would you make the distinction between the two?

Answer: Well, there was nothing done explicitly to prevent Windows from running on that operating system. That’s what is meant by incompatibility. It’s simply a message. If we played a tune, that wouldn’t be an incompatibility. That’s what is meant by incompatibility. It’s simply a message. If we played a tune, that wouldn’t be an incompatibility.

Just fancy that!

It’s hard to imagine now, but there was a time when the mainstream press was barely acquainted with the genius and foresight of today’s technology leaders.

Fifteen years ago Bill Gates appeared on the BBC’s Wogan show – which the Beeb thought of as a nightly Johnny Carson, but which was really like watching Regis Philbin on cough syrup – to show off his WinPad PC. The wooden Gates made a joke about making his money disappear, with only a couple of clicks, using only a stylus. As Gates blinked, a nation which had never heard of Microsoft, and couldn’t quite figure out why the guy in glasses wasn’t singing or dancing, looked on in sympathetic embarrassment.

But Gates’s prime time TV appearance underscored one point, popular in the public prints at the time, which was that a nerdish, upstart technology was changing the very foundations of the world as we know it. Microsoft was simply smarter, more agile, more cunning, and far more darkly mysterious than the fusty incumbents, like IBM, could ever realize. To stand in the way of Microsoft was to stand in the way of youth, innovation and progress itself.

Now, it may puzzle you as much as it puzzles us that this idea ever gained popular currency – let’s save that discussion for another day. But it can’t have escaped your notice that this mythical struggle has been reprised by the inkies several times – in the mid-1990s with Netscape – and today with the phoney war between Microsoft and Google.

If you’re of the view that history repeats itself the second time round as farce, then the parallels are even more uncomfortable.

Today, Microsoft is a software monopoly that equally, is barely acquainted with its own methods of production. The last Microsoft engineer who worked on the original incarnations of Windows left an engineering capacity at the company a long, long time ago and, as a consequence, a company that once could turn on a sixpence and drop off an OS refresh that seriously screwed a competitor now takes seven years to eke out an update. Insulated by the comfortable monopoly position it enjoys, Microsoft today isn’t even in control of Microsoft. But then again, why does it have to worry?

Now fast forward to 2006, where Google, if we’re to believe the popular prints, is simply smarter, more agile, more cunning, and far more darkly mysterious than its incumbents can fathom.

Or, er, is it?

When Google unleashed PageRank™ on the world, it really created a monster.
Google was so proud of its algorithm that it liked to boast that it mirrored the “inherent democracy” of the internet, a phrase which coyly and insidiously, flatters us all. PageRank™ was a truer representation of life than we ever realized, Google said, if only we cared to look.

The trouble is, PageRank only worked within a small dataset of peer reviewed academic journals. To extrapolate this into a way of life, as Google’s dreamy maths-obsessed boy wonders tried to do, was an essentially utopian gesture, which supposed that no one would try and game the system to their own nefarious ends. Only the inevitable happened, and as Google got more popular, and as the value of appearing in those top spots increased, Google gradually lost control of the algorithm which was once its muse. At the time, we remember, we gained very few plaudits for documenting this weary process – as Google was gradually gamed by desperate trinket salesmen, who built link farms to tout their wares – and by technology evangelists, who mistook overnight popularity for a validation of a lifetimes’s achievement. All were to fall to earth eventually, as technology offers no short cuts or backdoors when the calculations are finally made.

identify how much of its search index is comprised of robot-generated junk, designed to trick its PageRank™ algorithm. With billions of pages of “content” – pages of junk can be created on demand to populate cheap, disposable “web presences” – it’s beyond the wit of any algorithm to determine what’s real and what’s simulacra.

Like Microsoft, Google has simply been outsmarted. To read the popular press and discover that they’re arming for a billion dollar fight is like watching two dunken prize fighters hoping they’ll land a punch.

But thanks to blogger Mark McGuire for providing another dimension, one we and everyone else missed.

Just as Microsoft doesn’t have to care about the quality of its software, nor does Google (or Yahoo!, or any other want to be web destination) have to care about the quality of its product. Up to a point.

Noting the Big Daddy fiasco – Google’s attempt to weed out the spam from its search index – McGuire notes that Google profits from the irrelevance. Google makes next to no money from “search”, but makes all of its money from selling advertising.

Mark notes, as we do, a webmaster’s comment that the deterioration is gradually turning the SERPS [Search Results] back into a primordial soup:

“At this rate, in a year the SERPS will be nothing but Amazon affiliates, ebay auctions, and Wiki clones. Those sites don’t seem to be affected one bit by the supplemental hell, 301’s, and now deindexing.”

Mark observes:

“Google may take some action here and there, but I believe that they actually like a little mud in the main organic results for commercial terms. Why? Because less than stellar organic results (from practices like web spam) mean higher CTR’s on their paid links and more juice for their quarterly earnings.

“A little irrelevance is good for paid links and paid links is how Google makes money.”

If you want to be seen in Google, you have to pay to play – and create an Adwords account. How else are you going to be “seen”? In other words, it’s pay to play – the old economy reasserting itself with a vengeance.

This is a fascinating subject – how far can you con the public without being rumbled? Google executives may well look at Microsoft’s history and conclude they can ride the goodwill train for many years. A cynic may say the public doesn’t really care about the mechanisms, so long as they’re being delivered real results.

But the public is increasingly sophisticated, and as the web spammers have proved (the “Big Daddy” fiasco being the primary evidence) more than capable of outwitting Google.